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DANGER AT 700,000 FEET: WHY THE 
UNITED STATES NEEDS TO DEVELOP 
A KINETIC ANTI-SATELLITE MISSILE 
TECHNOLOGY TEST-BAN TREATY 
The second best thing about space travel is that the dis-
tances involved make war very difficult, usually imprac-
tical, and almost always unnecessary . . . . [This] is a 
great boon to the intelligent man who fights only when 
he must—never for sport. 
Robert A. Heinlein, Time Enough For Love, 1973.1 
 
Two things inspire me to awe—the starry heavens above 
and the moral universe within. 
Attributed to Albert Einstein.2 
 
It’s too bad, but the way American people are, now that 
they have all this capability, instead of taking advantage 
of it, they’ll probably just piss it all away. 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, overheard during a visit to the 
Apollo 7 crew, 1968.3 
INTRODUCTION 
hey called it Operation Burnt Frost.4 At approximately 
10:26 p.m., eastern standard time, on February 20, 2008, 
the U.S.S. Lake Erie launched a single Standard Missle-3 
(“SM-3”) projectile.5 Upon entering low-earth orbit, the SM-3 
intercepted and destroyed USA-193, a United States spy satel-
                                                                                                                                     
 1. DAVID M. HARLAND, EXPLORING THE MOON: THE APOLLO EXPEDITION 71 
(1999). 
 2. THE ULTIMATE QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 474 (Alice Calaprice ed., 2011). 
 3. ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, TIME ENOUGH FOR LOVE (1973) 
 4. Col. Jay Raymond, Operations Group Blazes New Trail During Opera-
tion Burnt Frost, PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE NEWS (Mar. 11, 2008), 
http://www.peterson.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123089765. 
 5. Press Release, DoD Succeeds In Interpreting Non-Functioning Satel-
lite, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Feb. 20, 
2008), http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11704. 
T
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lite that had been malfunctioning.6 According to the Pentagon, 
the missile struck the 5,000 pound satellite7 as it orbited at 
17,000 miles-per-hour 133 nautical miles above the Earth,8 
causing the satellite to break into thousands of pieces, each 
“smaller than a football.”9 Officials declared the kinetic anti-
satellite (“ASAT”)10 operation a great success;11 a Congressman 
even proposed a bill to officially thank the crew of the Lake 
Erie.12 
However, the repeat of such an exercise could have drastic 
consequences for humanity’s outer space ambitions. Although 
“relatively little lasting debris was created” by the destruction 
of USA-193,13 experience has shown that another kinetic ASAT 
operation could create thousands of pieces of debris in orbit 
around Earth, each capable of causing serious or even cata-
strophic damage to other spacecraft, both manned and un-
manned.14 For instance, a Chinese demonstration of their ki-
                                                                                                                                     
 6. U.S. Missile Hits Spy Satellite, NEWSCIENTIST (Feb. 21, 2008), 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13359-us-missile-hits-spy-
satellite.html. 
 7. Gerry J. Gilmore, Navy Missile Likely Hit Fuel Tank on Disabled Sat-
ellite, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Feb. 21, 2008), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49030. 
 8. Fred W. Baker III, Gates Pleased by Mission’s Success, AMERICAN 
FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Feb. 21, 2008), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49025. 
 9. Press Release, Satellite Debris Analysis Indicates Hydrazine Tank Hit, 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Feb. 25, 2008), 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11709. 
 10. A kinetic anti-satellite weapon is one that will “destroy targets by the 
force of impact.” China’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test Criticized, FIN. TIMES 
(Jan. 19, 2007, 12:55 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bddab382-a77a-11db-
b448-0000779e2340.html#axzz1exhRqejM. 
 11. Officials Declare Satellite Mission Successful, AMERICAN FORCES PRESS 
SERVICE (Feb. 25, 2008), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49066. 
 12. H. R. Res. 1004, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 13. SPACE SECURITY 2009  at 9 (Jessica West ed., 2009), available at 
http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2009.pdf. 
 14. Space Junk at Tipping Point, Says Report, BBC NEWS (Sept. 1, 2011, 
8:28 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-14757926. 
  The phrase ‘space debris’ refers to all non-functional man-made 
space objects. There are four categories of debris: (1) inactive pay-
loads, (2) operational debris, (3) fragmentation debris, and (4) micro-
particulate debris. Inactive payloads are defunct satellites that drift 
through space. Operational debris includes anything released into 
2013] ANTI-SATELLITE MISSILE TEST-BAN TREATY 763 
netic ASAT technology in January 2007 created an estimated 
150,000 debris particles larger than one centimeter.15 
While space is incalculably vast, the area directly around the 
planet Earth has grown cluttered; in fact, there are currently 
more than 22,000 pieces of debris in orbit that are large enough 
to be actively tracked,16 but that number represents only an 
                                                                                                                                     
space during the course of a mission, such as spent rocket stages, ex-
ploding bolts, and lens caps ejected prior to camera operation. Frag-
mentation debris, which makes up the greatest segment of the debris 
population, consists of fragments born of collisions and explosions. 
Microparticulate debris consists largely of paint chips from deterio-
rating surfaces and particles created by the burning of solid rocket 
fuels. 
  Debris can also be divided into three size groups: (1) “large” objects 
with a diameter over ten centimeters, (2) “medium” objects with a 
diameter between ten centimeters and one millimeter, and (3) 
“small” objects less than one millimeter in diameter . . . . Smaller de-
bris is far more numerous: tens of millions of “medium”-sized pieces 
of debris float in space while trillions of “small” pieces wash across 
the orbits like waves of sand. 
  Medium and small fragmentation debris is particularly dangerous 
because this debris typically travels much faster than large debris 
and can be shot in any direction by the explosive force of a collision. 
An individual piece of debris may reach speeds up to fifteen kilome-
ters per second (54,000 kilometers per hour). At this speed, a frag-
ment the size of a bullet could torpedo a space station or destroy a 
satellite. A much smaller fragment would easily pierce an astro-
naut’s suit. Even small particles traveling at a relatively low speed 
can over time degrade the surfaces of spacecraft components. Dis-
turbingly, ninety-nine percent of all orbital debris is composed of this 
deadlier class of debris with a diameter under ten centimeters. 
Mark J. Sundahl, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for A Market-Share 
Liability Regime, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 128–29 (2000) (in-
ternal citations omitted). 
 15. Jonathan Amos, Space Debris: Time to clean up the sky, BBC NEWS 
(Sept. 2, 2011, 7:55 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-
14763668. 
 16. Id. However, the United States and Russia “do not track debris smaller 
than ten centimeters in diameter. Therefore, the vast majority of space de-
bris, which is composed of fragments less than ten centimeters in diameter, 
has been left ‘unidentified.’” Sundahl, supra note 14, at 133, citing Technical 
Report on Space Debris, Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/720 at 5. Fewer than 5 percent of the man-made objects being 
tracked are operational satellites, the remainder is debris. Lieutenant Colo-
nel Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A 
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estimated 10 percent of the objects in orbit.17 Each piece of de-
bris travels at speeds up to 17,500 miles-per-hour, “fast enough 
for a relatively small piece of orbital debris to damage a satel-
lite or a spacecraft.”18 “Even tiny paint flecks can damage a 
spacecraft when traveling at these velocities.”19 Making mat-
ters worse, the pace of the accumulation of debris in space has 
greatly increased in the last decade.20 The “growth of this in-
discriminate hazard” will restrict mankind’s use of space. 21 
“The danger is that each collision exponentially raises the po-
tential for another, such that a debris cascade could someday 
render entire orbits unusable.”22 In September 2011, the Na-
                                                                                                                                     
Proposal for A Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk, 44 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 594 (2011), quoting SPACE SECURITY 2010, at 31 
(Cesar Jaramillo et al., eds. 2010). 
 17. Video, Brink: Space Junk, DISCOVERY.COM (June 29, 2009), 
http://science.discovery.com/videos/brink-package-space-junk.html (last visit-
ed Nov. 21, 2011). 
 18. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Space Debris and 
Human Spacecraft, 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html (last 
updated Oct. 23, 2010). 
 19. Id. As of 2007, the U.S. Space Shuttle’s windows required replacement 
“55 times because of small debris hits that caused pockmarks, but thankfully 
did not crack them, which could have had catastrophic consequences.” Mi-
chael Krepon, A Code of Conduct for Responsible Space-Faring Nations, Cele-
brating the Space Age: 50 Years of Space Technology 40 Years of the Outer 
Space Treaty, Conference Report 166 (Apr. 3, 2007), 
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2675.pdf. For a humorous interpre-
tation of this serious situation, see Rhett & Link, Space Junk Song, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Fy7psIuJjc (uploaded July 6, 2009). 
 20. William J. Lynn, III, A Military Strategy for the New Space Environ-
ment, 34 WASH. Q. 7, 8 (2011), citing U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE 
STRATEGY: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (January 2011), avail-
able at 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/NationalSecurity
SpaceStrategyUnclassifiedSummary_Jan2011.pdf. 
 21. Michael Krepon & Samuel Black, An International Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Spacefaring Nations, in SPACE SAFETY REGULATIONS AND 
STANDARDS 243 (Joseph N. Pelton & Ram Jakhu eds., 2010). 
 22. William J. Lynn, III, Defining a Military Strategy for the New Space 
Environment, EARTH IMAGING JOURNAL, http://eijournal.com/2011/defining-a-
military-strategy-for-the-new-space-environment. “Experts warn that if the 
cascade effect occurs, space will be unusable for centuries due to the time it 
will take for all of the debris to eventually disintegrate in Earth’s atmos-
phere.” Imburgia, supra note 16, at 598, citing Sundahl, supra note 14, at 
132. 
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tional Research Council released a report warning that we may 
have reached “a tipping point, with enough [debris] currently 
in orbit to continually collide and create even more debris . . . 
.”23 With each piece of orbital debris capable of causing serious 
damage,24 an increase in the amount of debris in orbit will like-
ly prove prohibitive to the basic utilization, let alone explora-
tion, of space.25 
This Note argues that, in order to help slow the accumulation 
of space debris, the United States should endeavor to form a 
treaty with China, Russia, India and other space-faring nations 
that would ban the testing of kinetic ASAT missile systems; the 
use of these weapons will hinder humanity’s further use of 
space and other preferable technologies exist to serve as a 
means of national self-defense in times of war. Part I of this 
Note will provide a brief history of the laws applying to space-
faring nations, including the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Part 
II will provide a history of ASAT technology. Part III will pro-
vide a discussion of alternative methods that are available, and 
why those alternative methods should be used. Part IV will 
discuss why the time has come for the United States to enter 
into a test-ban treaty on the usage of kinetic ASAT technology. 
I. HISTORY OF SPACE LAW 
A. Origins 
The age of human exploration of outer space dawned on Oc-
tober 4, 1957, when the former Soviet Union launched a beach-
                                                                                                                                     
 23. BBC NEWS, supra note 14; Space junk a ‘serious issue’, BBC NEWS 
(Sept. 2, 2011, 7:15 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-
14762620. 
 24. “[A] piece of orbiting junk the size of a cherry collides with the force of 
an exploding grenade.”Andy Duckworth, The destructive power of space junk 
– video, GUARDIAN, Mar. 15, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/video/2011/mar/15/space-debris-european-
space-agency. 
 25. For instance, on March 12, 2009, “space debris forced astronauts 
aboard the International Space Station to take shelter in an escape capsule 
out of fear that debris would collide with the station.” Imburgia, supra note 
16, at 591, citing Traci Watson, Space Junk Forces Crew to Scram: Astro-
nauts Enter Escape Pod in Case Debris Hit Station, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 
2009, at 2A. 
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ball sized, 184 pound satellite known as Sputnik.26 However, 
the legal exploration of space had already begun. In January of 
that year, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the United States Ambassa-
dor to the United Nations, addressed the U.N. General Assem-
bly and declared that the United States hoped “future devel-
opment of outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful 
and scientific purposes.”27 Several months later—still prior to 
Sputnik—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced the 
willingness of the United States to “devise a ‘system which 
would insure that outer space missiles would be used exclusive-
ly for peaceful and scientific purposes’ and ‘for the benefit of 
mankind.’”28 
On August 29, 1957, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and France—in a joint submission to the U.N. Disarmament 
Commission—called for an inspection system that would en-
sure that “the sending of objects through outer space will be 
exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.”29 A little more 
than two months later, on November 14, 1957, the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly adopted Resolution 1148(XII), which incorpo-
rated the western powers’ proposal almost verbatim.30 The next 
year, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 
1348(XIII), “[r]ecognizing the common interest of mankind in 
outer space and recognizing that it is the common aim that 
outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only . . . .”31 
The resolution also established the ad hoc Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”).32 In 1963, COPUOS 
                                                                                                                                     
 26. Steve Garber, Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, 
http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
 27. Ivan A. Vlasic, Space Law and the Military Applications of Space 
Technology, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 385, 390 (Nandasiri 
Jasentuliyana ed., 1995), quoting P. Jessup & H. Taubenfeld, CONTROLS FOR 
OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARTIC ANALOGY 252 (1959). 
 28. Ivan A. Vlasic, The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, in PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE 37, 38 
(Bhupendra Jasani ed., 1991), quoting P. Jessup & H. Taubenfeld, supra note 
27. 
 29. U.N. Doc. DC/SC.1/66, (Aug. 29, 1957), in Fifth Report of the Sub-
Committee of the Disarmament Commission (DC/113), Annex 5. 
 30. G.A. Res 1148(XII), ¶ 1(f), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1148(XII) (Nov. 14, 1957). 
 31. QUESTION OF THE PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACE, G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/1348(XIII) (Dec. 13, 1958). 
 32. Id.COPUOS was made a regular committee of the General Assembly 
the next year in Resolution 1472(XIV). INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE 
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prepared and put forward Resolution 1962, the “Declaration of 
Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space” (known in short as the 
“Principles Declaration”).33 Unanimously adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly, the Principles Declaration pronounced the Gen-
eral Assembly to be “[i]nspired by the great prospects opening 
up before mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer space . 
. . .”34 The “Principles Declaration” played a large part in facili-
tating the development of the Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 27 
                                                                                                                                     
PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE, G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1472 
(XIV) (Dec. 12, 1959). 
 33. U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RES., COMMON SECURITY IN OUTER SPACE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 13, U.N. Sales No. GV.E.06.0.3 (2006) (by Detlev 
Wolter) [hereinafter Wolter, COMMON SECURITY]. 
 34. DECLARATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF 
STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/1962 (XVIII) (Dec. 13, 1963) (emphasis in original). In the 
Principles Declaration, all member states agreed to be guided by a set of 
principles providing, among other things, that: 
(1) The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on for the 
benefit and in the interests of all mankind . . . . 
(6) In the exploration and use of outer space, States shall be guided 
by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall con-
duct all their activities in outer space with due regard for the corre-
sponding interests of other States. If a State has reason to believe 
that an outer space activity or experiment planned by it or its na-
tionals would cause potentially harmful interference with activities 
of other States in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, it 
shall undertake appropriate international consultations before pro-
ceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State which has rea-
son to believe that an outer space activity or experiment planned by 
another State would cause potentially harmful interference with ac-
tivities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space may re-
quest consultation concerning the activity or experiment . . . . 
(8) Each State which launches or procures the launching of an object 
into outer space, and each State from whose territory or facility an 
object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to a foreign 
State or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its com-
ponent parts on the earth, in air space, or in outer space . . . . 
Id. 
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January 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “The Outer Space 
Treaty of 1967,” or simply the “OST”).35 
B. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 
Ratified by nearly 100 countries, The Outer Space Treaty of 
1967, which is “sometimes referred to as ‘the Magna Carta’ or 
the ‘The Bible’ of outer space law” 36 uses the same wording of 
the ‘Principles Declaration’ in its preamble and confirms the 
fundamental principles that outer space is “‘the province of all 
mankind.’”37 Article IX, in particular provides that 
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall 
be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assis-
tance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, in-
cluding the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard 
to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to 
the Treaty . . . . If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to 
believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its na-
tionals in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with ac-
tivities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and 
use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bod-
ies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations 
before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A 
State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an 
activity or experiment planned by another State Party in out-
er space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would 
cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the 
peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation 
concerning the activity or experiment.38 
Article VII also provides that “Each State Party to the Treaty 
that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer 
space . . . is internationally liable for damage to another State 
Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by 
                                                                                                                                     
 35. Wolter, COMMON SECURITY, supra note 33, at 17. 
 36. Alexander Soucek, International Law, in OUTER SPACE IN SOCIETY, 
POLITICS AND LAW 298 (Chistian Brunner & Alexander Soucek eds., 2011). 
 37. Wolter, COMMON SECURITY, supra note 33, at 19, quoting Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 
18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Treaty on Principles]. 
 38. Treaty on Principles, art. 9. 
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such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or 
in outer space . . . .”39 
These articles may have been part of an international re-
sponse to a 1963 United States space communications experi-
ment called Project West Ford, in which the U.S. Air Force 
launched 480 million tiny copper needles40 that gradually dis-
persed in space, creating a ring fifteen kilometers wide and 
thirty kilometers thick, encircling the globe at an altitude of 
around 2,300 miles.41 The Air Force believed that, if it worked, 
Project West Ford would serve as a prototype for two more 
permanent rings that would guarantee their ability to com-
municate across the globe.42 Although the project was techni-
cally successful (scientists on the east coast of the United 
States communicated with scientists on the west coast),43 the 
scientific community fervently objected on grounds that the 
needles could cause “potentially harmful inference with radio 
astronomy, optical astronomy, space communications, and 
space travel.”44 It is notable that clumps of the needles re-
mained in orbit past the year 2000, and may still remain in 
space.45 
It is also noteworthy that, while the OST limits signatories to 
“peaceful uses” of space, it never defines the term.46 This ambi-
guity becomes clear upon comparison with Section 1, Article I 
of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959: “Antarctica shall be used for 
peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, 
                                                                                                                                     
 39. Treaty on Principles, art. 7. 
 40. Each of which were 1.8 centimeters long and 0.0018 centimeters in 
diameter and weighed only forty micrograms. Anthony Kendall, Earth’s Arti-
ficial Ring: Project West Ford (May 2, 2006), 
http://www.damninteresting.com/earths-artificial-ring-project-west-ford/. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Project West Ford: Brass Tacks, HARV. CRIMSON (May 24, 1963), 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1963/5/24/project-west-ford-pfour-
hundred-million/. 
 43. Andrew J. Butrica, Beyond the Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite 
Communication, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4217/intro.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
 44. Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: an Assess-
ment of Legal Obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 J. 
SPACE L. 321, 327 (2008). 
 45. Spacecraft, West Ford Dipoles (Sept. 18, 2003), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070312200131/http://www.aoe.vt.edu/~cdhall/Sp
ace/archives/000289.html. 
 46. Treaty on Principles, supra note 37. 
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any measure of a military nature, such as the establishment of 
military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military 
manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapon.”47 
The OST’s vagueness allows for interpretations that permit 
military activities that can be defined as non-aggressive and/or 
defensive; in fact, “except for the stationing of nuclear weapons 
and [other] weapons of mass destruction, all other forms of mil-
itary activity are permitted in outer space.”48 Such an interpre-
tation is embodied in the most recent declaration of the United 
States’ national space policy, which states: 
The United States will employ a variety of measures to help 
assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, con-
sistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others 
from interference and attack, defend our space systems and 
contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if de-
terrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.49 
In fact, the Americans have been accused of being the reason 
behind the ambiguity.50 According to former COPUOS chair-
man Peter Jankowitsch, the American government considered 
military “support activities,” such as using satellites for recon-
naissance, navigation, and surveillance, to be part of the 
framework for its strategy of nuclear deterrence.51 Given its 
recent national space policy, it seems very likely that the 
                                                                                                                                     
 47. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. See 
S. Chandrashekar, Problems of Definition: A View of an Emerging Space 
Power, in PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE 77, 81 (Bhu-
pendra Jasani ed., 1991). 
 48. Chandrashekar, supra note 47. According to Alexander Yakovenko, 
official spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, as of July 3, 2002, 
“the 1967 Outer Space Treaty did ban placing all the kinds of [weapons of 
mass destruction] in space and on celestial bodies, but today there are no 
legal barriers whatsoever to the placement in orbit around the Earth of any 
other weapons.” News Review, Russia and China Introduce Draft Treaty on 
Space Weapons, DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (Sept. 2002), available at 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd66/66nr07.htm. 
 49. National Space Policy of the United States of America, June 28, 2010, 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-
10.pdf. 
 50. Wolter, COMMON SECURITY, supra note 33, quoting P. Jankowitsch, 
From Cold War to Detente in Outer Space: The Role of the United Nations in 
Outer Space Law Development, in PROCEEDINGS FROM THE 40TH COLLOQUIUM 
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 45 (1998). 
 51. Id. 
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American government, if not other governments as well, would 
object to a total ban—similar to that of the Antarctic Treaty—
on military usage of outer space.52 
C. The Liability Convention of 1972 
In making COPUOS a regular committee of the General As-
sembly, Resolution 1472(XIV) mandated that COPUOS needed 
“[t]o study the nature of legal problems which may arise from 
the exploration of outer space.”53 Pursuant to that mandate, in 
1962, COPUOS established a special legal subcommittee to ex-
amine the legal implications of space activities.54 Soon, the le-
gal subcommittee began encountering legal problems that the 
OST’s signatories had not initially anticipated. One such issue 
came to light on June 5, 1969, when fragments of a device 
launched into outer space struck a Japanese cargo ship off the 
coast of Siberia, causing damage to the ship and injuring five 
sailors.55 Following this incident, Belgium, Hungary, India, and 
Italy submitted to COPUOS drafts for a convention on liabil-
ity. 56  On November 29, 1971, the U.N. General Assembly 
adopted the Liability Convention,57 and it entered into force in 
September 1972.58 
Elaborating on the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Conven-
tion provides that a “launching State shall be absolutely liable 
to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on 
                                                                                                                                     
 52. The United States has previously declared that it would be unwilling 
to negotiate a treaty prohibiting space weapons. Union of Concerned Scien-
tists, International Legal Agreements Relevant to Space Weapons (Feb. 2004), 
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/
policy_issues/international-legal.html. 
 53. G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), supra note 32. 
 54. I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & V. KOPAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO SPACE 
LAW 34 (3d ed. 2008). 
 55. Id. at 35, citing Summary Record of the One Hundred and Thirty-First 
(Closing) Meeting of the Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.131 at 5-6. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. G.A. Res 2777, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2777 (Nov. 29, 1971). 
 58. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Convention on Interna-
tional Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 
U.S.T. 2389, 10 I.L.M 965 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. “As of October 
1, 2010, the Liability Convention had ninety ratifications and twenty-three 
signatures. North Korea is a nonparty, but ratifications include the United 
States, Russia, China, and even Iran.” Imburgia, supra note 16, at 616, citing 
Liability Convention. 
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the surface of the earth or to aircraft flight” and liable for dam-
age in space due to its faults, “or fault of persons for whom it is 
responsible.”59 The convention also states that “[n]o exonera-
tion whatever shall be granted” when the damage is caused by 
activities that fail to conform to the standards provided by in-
ternational law including, in particular, the OST.60 Scholars 
have called the Liability Convention “the most relevant space 
law treaty regarding space debris.”61 
D. The Registration Convention of 1975 
COPUOS soon discovered that “a mandatory system of regis-
tering objects launched into outer space would, in particular, 
assist in their identification and would contribute to the appli-
cation and development of international law governing the ex-
ploration and use of outer space . . . .”62 Registration of objects 
launched into space serves two important functions in preserv-
ing the peaceful use of outer space: “(1) it is not possible to 
identify [the source of a damaging object] without a system of 
registration; [and] (2) a well-ordered, complete and informative 
system of registration would minimize the likelihood and even 
the suspicion of weapons” being put into space.63 Recognizing 
this, COPUOS put forth the Registration Convention, which 
                                                                                                                                     
 59. G.A. Res 2777, supra note 57. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See, e.g. Irene Atney-Yurdin, Space Debris Legal Research Guide, 3 
PACE Y.B. INT’L L. 167, 182 (1991). For instance, under the Liability Conven-
tion, multiple attempts have been made by nations to recover for damages 
caused by space debris. See Joseph A. Burke, Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects: Definition and Determination 
of Damages After the Cosmos 954 Incident, 8 FORDHAM INT’L L.J., 255, 273 
(1984) (discussing the Canadian attempt to recover from the Soviet Union 
after the destruction of a Soviet satellite, Cosmos 954, caused nuclear debris 
to land in Canadian Northwest Territories); Hannah Siemer, Littering Fine 
Paid, ESPERANCE EXPRESS (Apr. 17, 2009), 
http://www.esperanceexpress.com.au/news/local/news/general/littering-fine-
paid/1488319.aspx (discussing Australian recovery for the clean-up of pieces 
of the American space-station Skylab, which disintegrated over Australia); cf. 
Gunnar Leinberg, Orbital Space Debris, 4 J.L. & TECH. 93, 103 (1989) (“The 
[Liability Convention] is very useful in situations where damage has oc-
curred, but is not very helpful in the prevention or control of orbital space 
debris.”). 
 62. Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3235 (Nov. 12, 1974). 
 63. Diederiks-Verschoor & Kopal, supra note 54, at 44. 
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was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly without a vote on 
November 12, 1974, opened for signature on January 14, 1975, 
and entered into force on September 15, 1976.64 Article IV of 
the Convention requires that all launching States contact the 
Secretary-General of the U.N. and inform him of the “(a) name 
of launching State or States; (b) . . . appropriate designator of 
the space object or its registration number; (c) date and territo-
ry or location of launch; (d) basic orbital parameters . . . [, and] 
(e) general function of the space object.”65 Despite the require-
ment for disclosure of the general function of the satellite, al-
ternate—or ulterior—purposes or functions need not be dis-
closed.66 
E. 2007 Nonbinding Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines 
On February 1, 2008, the U.N. General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 62/217, which endorsed COPUOS’s Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines.67 The General Assembly agreed that the 
                                                                                                                                     
 64. Id. “As of October 1, 2010, [the Registration Convention] had been rati-
fied by fifty-four states, including the United States, Russia, China, and even 
North Korea. Four countries, including Iran, have signed but not ratified the 
Registration Convention.” Imburgia, supra note 16, at 618 (internal citations 
omitted), citing Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space, U.N. Office Outer Space Aff., http:// 
www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SORegister/index.html (last visited Nov. 20, 
2011). Additionally, “two international intergovernmental organizations (the 
European Space Agency and the European Organization for the Exploitation 
of Meteorological Satellites) have declared their acceptance of the rights and 
obligations provided for in the Convention.” Id. at 618 n.237. 
 65. Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3235 (Nov. 12, 1974). 
 66. See Diederiks-Verschoor & Kopal, supra note 54, at 45 (“The main 
problem emanating from [the Registration Convention] lies in the unwilling-
ness of states to disclose that they have launched satellites for military pur-
poses, or their real missions. Even when only the slightest indication about 
the object’s general purpose is asked, states are often unwilling to provide 
such information.”). 
 67. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, G.A. Res. 
62/217 (LXII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/90, (Feb. 1, 2008). COPUOS had provided 
the U.N. General Assembly with the following seven nonbinding guidelines 
for the mitigation of space debris: 
Guideline 1: Limit debris released during normal operations; . . . . 
Guideline 2: Minimize the potential for break-ups during operational 
phases; . . . . 
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guidelines would be voluntary, although they also reflected 
“the existing practices as developed by a number of national 
and international organizations, and invited Member States to 
implement those guidelines through relevant national mecha-
nisms.”68 
However, because the guidelines reflect already “existing 
practices,”69 and are nonbinding in nature, they are effectively 
toothless.70 While nonbinding agreements can become binding 
customary law through continued usage, that is unlikely to be 
the case with space debris.71 Further action is required. 
                                                                                                                                     
Guideline 3: Limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit; . . . . 
Guideline 4: Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activi-
ties; . . . . 
Guideline 5: Minimize potential for post-mission break-ups resulting 
from stored energy; . . . . 
Guideline 6: Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch 
vehicle orbital stages in the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the 
end of their mission; and . . . . 
Guideline 7: Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and 
launch vehicle orbital stages with the geosynchronous Earth orbit 
(GEO) region after the end of their mission. 
Imburgia, supra note 16, at 623-24. 
 68. G.A. Res. 62/217 (LXII), supra note 67. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Imburgia, supra note 16, at 624–25. 
 71. Id. at 625. 
Customary international law on space debris is never likely to devel-
op. The first problem is that the prevailing, but not universal, state 
practice among the specially affected states is to limit the creation of 
new orbital debris when it is cost-effective and can be accomplished 
without negative mission impact. Since the space race began, states 
abandoned satellites in space and made no effort to minimize the 
creation of new debris. Incidents such as [FY-1C], and [USA-193], 
provide additional evidence that consistent state practice has not yet 
solidified regarding space debris mitigation, and even if it has, states 
do not feel obligated to follow that practice. 
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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II. HISTORY OF ASAT SYSTEMS 
Within two years of Sputnik, the United States military be-
gan to conduct ASAT missile technology testing.72 On Septem-
ber 22, 1959, the U.S. Air Force launched a missile from a jet at 
35,000 feet in an attempt to intercept the Explorer V satellite.73 
Another test was conducted three weeks later, on October 13, 
that “successfully passed within 6.4 km (4 miles) of” Explorer 
VI.74 Other early U.S. tests, which continued until 1970, “in-
volved components of systems that would have relied on nucle-
ar detonations to destroy their targets.”75 “The Soviet Union 
began research into ASAT systems around 1960 and first test-
ed prototype components in 1967. Moscow then conducted sev-
en ASAT tests between 1968 and 1971, and an additional 13 
tests from 1976 to 1982.”76 In 1976, renewed Soviet ASAT test-
ing led the United States to develop a kinetic-energy ASAT 
missile launched from an F-15 fighter.77 
Around this time, the Carter Administration attempted nego-
tiations to address anti-satellite warfare. President Carter de-
clared that “‘verifiable, comprehensive limits on antisatellite 
capabilities’ were in the U.S. national security interest . . . .”78 
However, these negotiations failed in large part due to the 
United States’ use of the Space Shuttle. The Soviets feared that 
the Space Shuttle’s arm gave it capability to capture a satellite, 
stow it in the shuttle’s cargo bay, and take it back to Earth.79 
Negotiations also broke-down over a failure to agree on what 
constituted a space weapon.80 ASAT testing continued. 
                                                                                                                                     
 72. See Andreas Parsch, Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles, 
http://designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/ws-199.html. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Ross Liemer & Christopher F. Chyba, A Verifiable Limited Test Ban 
for Anti-Satellite Weapons, WASH. Q. 149, 152 (July 2010). Andrew T. Park, 
Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for A New Way of 
Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space, 28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 871, 877 
(2006), citing Michael Krepon & Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space 
Dominance?: The Case Against Weaponizing Space, THE HENRY L. STIMSON 
CENTER, 94 (2003), http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-
pdfs/spacebook.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2011). 
 76. Liemer & Chyba, supra note 75. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Krepon & Clary, supra note 75, at 6. 
 79. Krepon, supra note 19, at 168. 
 80. For instance, see Krepon, supra note 19, at 168: 
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As Ross Liemer and Christopher Chyba noted “[b]etween 
1984 and 1986, the United States conducted five tests of the F-
15 ASAT missile launching system, only one of which damaged 
a satellite.”81 They go on to add that “[i]n September 1985, the 
Air Force crashed an ASAT homing vehicle into Solwind P78-1, 
a solar research satellite, at an altitude of 525 km.”82 The im-
pact created 285 pieces of debris large enough to be tracked, 
most of which fell out of orbit within a decade.83 Ironically, the 
United States’ successful interception of the Solwind, which 
was done in response to Soviet testing, came after Soviet leader 
Yuri Andropov announced a unilateral moratorium on ASAT 
tests in 1983, much to the dismay of the Soviet military estab-
lishment.84 
Following the Solwind interception, no significant anti-
satellite testing occurred for twenty years.85 Both the United 
                                                                                                                                     
First and foremost, a treaty banning space weapons requires an 
agreed definition of space weapons. What is it that we seek to ban? 
Many things can be used as space weapons. As noted above, marbles 
could be tested, deployed and used as space weapons. Do we ban 
marbles? Jamming devices can be used as space weapons. Many 
countries have jammers. Do we ban jammers? Lasers can be used as 
space weapons. But lasers can also be used as space tracking, range 
finding, intelligence collection or communication devices. Do we ban 
lasers? 
 81. Liemer & Chyba, supra note 75, at 152. 
 82. Id. The Union of Concerned Scientists and four Democratic members of 
the House of Representatives—George E. Brown Jr. of California, Joe Moak-
ley of Massachusetts, Matthew F. McHugh of New York, and John F. Seiber-
ling of Ohio—attempted to seek an injunction in federal court to prevent the 
Solwind interception. However, “District Court Judge Norma Johnson denied 
the motion, partly on the grounds that she viewed the issue as a ‘political 
question’ between the legislative and executive branches of Government in 
which the court should not intervene.” See Judge Won’t Bar Test Firing At 
Satellite, Expected Today, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1985, at A8. 
 83. The last piece fell back to Earth in 2004. Liemer & Chyba, supra note 
75, at 152. 
 84. See Anatoly Zak, Spacecraft: Military: IS anti-satellite system, Russian 
Space Web, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/is.html (last visited Jan. 23, 
2013). 
 85. See David A. Koplow, ASAT-Isfaction: Customary International Law 
and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187, 1209–
1210 (2009) [hereinafter Koplow, ASAT]. See also, Brendan Nicholson, World 
Fury at satellite destruction, THE AGE, (Jan. 20, 2007), 
http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/fury-at-space-
destruction/2007/01/19/1169095981210.html (FY-1C is “is the world’s first 
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States and the Soviet Union/Russia claimed to have ceased 
testing out of concerns that the debris resulting from the test-
ing could harm civilian and military satellite operations.86 
However, at 5:28 p.m., eastern standard time, on January 11, 
2007, China shattered the silence with their own successful 
missile test. 87 The characteristics of the test indicated a clear 
intent to demonstrate the power of the Chinese military.88 The 
interception and destruction of the Feng Yun 1C (FY-1C) mete-
orological satellite occurred at an altitude “consistent with the 
operational altitudes of American and Japanese imagery intel-
ligence satellites.”89 Despite having knowledge of China’s aspi-
rations, including knowledge of two previous tests,90 the suc-
cessful test still caused “shock” in United States high military 
command.91 
                                                                                                                                     
[ASAT test] since the 1980s.”). Although no significant testing occurred, 
ASAT technology continued to receive large amounts of funding. Koplow, 
ASAT at 1209. Soviet ASAT funding continued into 1991. Anatoly Zak, supra 
note 84. 
 86. See China confirms satellite downed, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2007, 10:52 
AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6289519.stm. 
 87. See Chinese Anti-Satellite [ASAT] Capabilities and ABM Capability, 
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/asat.htm (last visited Jan. 
23, 2013). 
 88. “It is hard to see the test other than as a display of China’s ability to 
challenge American space power.” Stormy Weather: China and Space, ECON., 
Jan. 27, 2007, at 42. According to Jeffrey Kueter, president of the George C. 
Marshall Institute, an American nonprofit space and defense think tank in 
Washington, the destruction of FY-1C was the Chinese government “saying 
they can hold our space-based, war-fighting capability at risk, and are put-
ting into doubt our ability to challenge them.” Michael Krepon, president 
emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, another nonprofit involved with 
security issues in Washington, which has proposed a Code of Conduct that 
would ban the testing of kinetic ASAT technology, declared, “The Chinese are 
telling the Pentagon that they don’t own space.” Marc Kaufman & Dafna Lin-
zer, China Criticized for Anti-Satellite Missile Test Destruction of an Aging 
Satellite Illustrates Vulnerability of U.S. Space Assets, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 
2007, at A01. “Why should a country so insistent that its rise threatens no-
one stage such an open display of its ability to challenge American power in 
space?” China: Space Invaders, ECONOMIST (Jan. 22, 2007), 
http://www.economist.com/node/8579371. 
 89. GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, supra note 87. 
 90. These tests drew significantly less attention and were not made public 
because they were unsuccessful. Id. 
 91. Michael R. Gordon & David S. Cloud, U.S. Knew of China’s Missile 
Test, but Kept Silent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, at A1. 
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Despite the “fury” and “condemnation” that the international 
community leveled at the Chinese, 92  the American military 
would echo the test a year later in Operation Burnt Frost.93 
While the American government claimed that the only purpose 
for shooting down USA-193 was that the 450 kilogram fuel 
tank could land in a populated area and release toxic gas,94 the 
international community remained skeptical of that rationale.95 
The American media even joined in on questioning the gov-
ernment’s claim that USA-193 was being shot down only be-
cause of its fuel tank.96 
Interestingly, days before USA-193’s destruction, China an-
nounced, at a disarmament conference in Geneva, Switzerland, 
that it had joined with Russia to propose a treaty that “would 
prohibit the deployment of weapons in space and the use or 
threat of force against satellites or other craft.”97 The Chinese 
“accused Washington of hypocrisy for criticising other coun-
tries’ space ambitions while rejecting . . . [the Sino-Russian 
                                                                                                                                     
 92. See Nicholson, supra note 85. 
 93. The Russian military has also resumed its development of ASAT tech-
nology. Michail Fomichev, Russian officer says developing new weapon for 
space defense, RIANOVOSTI (May 15, 2010, 3:11 PM), 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100515/159029349.html. 
 94. NEWSCIENTIST, supra note 6. 
 95. See, e.g., US spy satellite plan ‘a cover’, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7248995.stm. 
 96. Some of the media attention tended toward the humorous. “Let’s think 
about this for a minute. If you were, say, sitting on the porch reading the 
newspaper when a satellite plummeted into the backyard, emitting foul-
smelling fumes, what are the chances you’d decide to stay very close to it and 
inhale a lot of it?” Gail Collins, Op-Ed., Look, Up in the Sky!, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
21, 2008, at A23. 
 97. News Review, Russia and China Introduce Draft Treaty on Space 
Weapons, supra note 48. The Sino-Russian treaty likely echoed the treaty 
proposed in 2002, which 
would bind states parties to three basic obligations: 1) “Not to place 
in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, 
not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such 
weapons in outer space in any other manner”; 2) “Not to resort to the 
threat or use of force against outer space objects”; 3) “Not to assist or 
encourage other states, groups of states, international organizations 
to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty.” 
Id. 
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treaty] to ban weapons in space and firing the missile at [USA-
193].”98 
While the American government did not overtly respond to 
the criticism, it has made overtures towards entering into a 
separate ASAT-usage-ban pact. 99  On January 27, 2011, the 
Washington Times reported that the Obama Administration 
had entered into negotiations with the European Union to sign 
onto their Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (“EU 
Code”).100 
A draft of the code of conduct dated Sept. 27 says countries 
that sign on to the document vow to “refrain from any action 
which intends to bring about, directly or indirectly, damage or 
destruction of outer space objects unless such action is con-
ducted to reduce the creation of outer space debris and/or is 
justified by the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense in accordance with the United Nations Charter or 
imperative safety considerations.”101 
Conservative critics decried the negotiations, condemning them 
as surrendering too much power to the Chinese and other 
states that had not signed onto the EU Code—the Chinese gov-
ernment “declined offers to discuss the issue.”102 In January 
2012, the United States announced that “in lieu of signing the 
EU code, it would work with the European Union to develop an 
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.”103 
                                                                                                                                     
 98. NEWSCIENTIST, supra note 6. 
 99. See Eli Lake, U.S., EU Eye Anti-Satellite Weapons Pact, WASH. TIMES 
(Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/27/us-eu-
eye-anti-satellite-weapons-pact/?page=all. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. One critic went so far as to compare the American talks with the 
EU to the Chamberlin governments Munich Conference with Hitler in 1939. 
James Burgos, Comment to Eli Lake, U.S., EU eye anti-satellite weapons 
pact, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/27/us-eu-eye-anti-satellite-
weapons-pact/?page=all. 
 102. See Omri Ceren, Op-Ed, Obama’s New Anti-Satellite Weapons Push to 
Cede Space to the Chinese?, COMMENTARY (Jan. 28, 2011, 4:12 PM), 
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/01/28/obamas-new-anti-satellite-
weapons-push-to-cede-space-to-the-chinese; Lake, supra note 99. 
 103. A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/
policy_issues/a-history-of-anti-satellite.html (last updated Feb. 16, 2012). 
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The international community could also adopt another pro-
posal, such as the Henry L. Stimson Center’s Code of Con-
duct,104 which was written by the American think-tank “work-
ing with a group of non-government experts from China, Rus-
sia, Canada, France and Japan.”105 However, it may be years 
before such an agreement is settled upon and, by the time such 
an agreement is in place, enough debris may have accumulated 
that it would be too late.106 Action must be taken now to pre-
vent what is called the “Kessler syndrome,” named after the 
NASA scientist who, in 1978, established a theory “in which 
fragments hit other fragments which in turn hit more, creating 
a cloud of debris that will make vast swathes of low-Earth orbit 
completely unusable.”107 In fact, it may already be too late; sci-
entists believe the Kessler syndrome may still occur “even in 
the absence of new spacecraft launches or ASAT tests.”108 
III. ALTERNATIVE METHODS 
Several preferable anti-satellite technologies exist with the 
ability to replace the current kinetic ASAT technology. These 
non-physical technologies include laser, microwave, radio fre-
quency, and electronic weapons; all of which present viable 
methods of self-defense without significantly increasing the 
amount of debris in orbit.109 Each of these ASAT technologies 
have already been deployed or heavily researched and there-
fore present viable alternatives to kinetic ASAT technology. 
                                                                                                                                     
 104. Michael Krepon, Space: A Code of Conduct, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER 
(2008), http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-
pdfs/MKrepon_Final_Format.pdf. 
 105. A New Arms Race in Space?, ECONOMIST (Jan. 25, 2007), 
http://www.economist.com/node/8592950?story_id=8592950. 
 106. See BBC NEWS, supra note 14. 
 107. Jason Palmer, Space junk could be tackled by housekeeping spacecraft, 
BBC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-
14405118. Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of 
Artificial Satellites: the Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 
2637–46 (June 1, 1978). 
 108. Ross Liemer & Christopher F. Chyba, supra note 75, at 155. 
 109. While all of the following technologies will disable an affected satellite, 
the effects are not always permanent. However, even a permanently disabled 
satellite is preferable as it constitutes a single, large, observable piece of de-
bris rather than thousands of tiny pieces. 
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A. Laser Weapon Technology 
Laser weapon technology functions by generating intense 
beams of light that can focus on distant targets.110 Multiple 
types of offensive lasers are reportedly being developed by Chi-
na, Russia, and the United States.111 
Low-power lasers are typically designed to spoof or jam satel-
lite electro-optical sensors using laser radiation . . . temporar-
ily blinding the satellite. High-power lasers can permanently 
damage or destroy a satellite by radiating enough energy to 
overheat its parts. The satellite systems which are susceptible 
to high-power lasers include satellite structures, thermal con-
trol surfaces and solar panels.112 
Lasers’ ability to temporarily “blind” a satellite by focusing on 
its optical sensors, causing the satellite to see only the laser 
beam, have been proven; the Chinese have, for several years, 
attempted to disable American spy satellites using laser tech-
nology.113 Laser weapon systems are also capable of being at-
tached to airplanes, allowing a mobile weapon capable of at-
tacking both missiles and satellites.114 Currently, offensive la-
                                                                                                                                     
 110. Tom Wilson, Threats to United States Space Capabilities, 
http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html#rft54 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). 
“Laser systems, including coherent radiation, aligned waveform, and other 
devices operating at or near the optical wavelengths, operate by delivering 
energy onto the surface of the target. The gradual or rapid absorption of this 
energy leads to several forms of thermal damage for weapons application.” Id. 
 111. Desmond Ball, Assessing China’s ASAT program, NAUTILUS INSTITUTE 
FOR SEC. AND SUSTAINABILITY, http://nautilus.org/apsnet/assessing-chinas-
asat-program/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). 
 112. Wilson, supra note 110. 
 113. Francis Harris, Beijing Secretly Fires Lasers to Disable US Satellites, 
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 26, 2006), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1529864/Beijing-secretly-fires-
lasers-to-disable-US-satellites.html; Chinese Anti-Satellite Laser, 
STRATEGYPAGE.COM (Sept. 26, 2006), 
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htspace/articles/20060926.aspx; see 
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, supra note 86. 
 114. Maj. Timothy J. Lincoln, Directed Energy Weapons: Do We Have a 
Game Plan? (2004) (unpublished monograph, School of Advanced Military 
Studies), available at http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/0406lincoln.pdf; 
REPORT: DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS, 
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, 
AND LOGISTICS 15–16 (Dec. 2007), available at 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA476320.pdf. 
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ser technology is being developed by Boeing, Lockheed Martin, 
and Northrop Grumman.115 
B. Radio Frequency Weapons 
Radio Frequency (“RF”) ASAT weapons concepts include 
ground-and-space-based RF emitters that fire an intense burst 
of radio energy at a satellite, which disables its electronic com-
ponents.116 RF weapons are usually divided into two categories: 
high power microwave (“HPM”) weapons and ultrawideband 
(“UWB” or “video pulse”) weapons.117 These weapons “produce 
                                                                                                                                     
 115. Space Weapons and Missile Defence Technology, REACHING CRITICAL 
WILL, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-
research/research-projects/6204-space-weapons-and-missile-defence-
technology (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). 
 116. Wilson, supra note 110. 
 117. Id. 
  UWB weapons would generate RF radiation covering a wide fre-
quency spectrum—nominally from about 100 MHz to more than 1 
GHz—with limited directivity. Because of the UWB weapon’s low-
energy spectral density and directivity, permanent damage to elec-
tronic components would be very difficult to achieve, except at very 
short ranges. The UWB couples through the satellite’s antenna at its 
receive frequency, as well as through openings in the systems shield-
ing. If enough power is applied, the received radiation may cause 
major damage to the satellite’s internal communications hardware 
such as RF amplifiers, downconverters, or other devices on the front-
end of the receiver. However, in many cases, UWB weapons may 
cause system upset, which may persist only while the target is being 
irradiated, or may require operator intervention to return the satel-
lite to its nominal functioning state. 
  HPM weapons would generate an RF beam at a very narrow fre-
quency band, in the 100 MHz to 100 GHz range, with higher di-
rectivity. The HPM devices operate by penetrating through antennas 
or into the interior of the target through cracks, apertures, or seams 
with longer wavelength radiation. The penetrating radiation causes 
damage or disruption as it is absorbed by internal electronic compo-
nents. Unlike traditional electronic warfare, the induced electrical 
energy does not need to be collected by a receiver in-band and made 
to look precisely like a train of specific input signals. Rather, UWB 
and HPM can produce so-called backdoor effects that arise from 
overwhelming circuits with induced signals and high power transi-
ents that penetrate system’s openings or cracks. It is difficult to close 
off these paths in a real system, since features such as openings and 
electrical wiring are essential to system operation. Since disruption 
and upset require induction of only a few volts at the extremely low 
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an effect quite similar to an exoatmospheric nuclear blast re-
sulting in upset, disruption, or burnout of the electronic com-
ponents within the targeted systems.”118 This effect “could be 
used to disrupt electro-optical sensors and onboard electronics 
of elements of surveillance and reconnaissance systems.”119 In 
theory, RF and microwave weapons can attack large areas and 
groups of targets, inflicting a “more subtle damage on electron-
ic components” than laser weapons, with an additional benefit 
of being “largely unaffected by clouds,” a downside of laser 
weapons.120 In the 2007 fiscal year, the United States Armed 
Forces spent nearly forty-seven billion dollars researching RF 
and microwave weapons.121 
C. Electronic Weapons 
While an electronic attack is defined as “any action involving 
the use of electromagnetic energy and directed energy to con-
trol the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack an adversary,”122 
this Note focuses only on the jamming and spoofing of satellite 
signals. A satellite’s signal can be disrupted with an intense 
competing signal causing the original signal to become 
“jammed.”123 The signal to the satellite can also be changed 
with incorrect information replacing the correct information, a 
process called “spoofing.”124 All military and commercial satel-
lite communications systems are susceptible to jamming or 
spoofing.125 In either case, the offending party must operate in 
the same radio band as the system being jammed.126 Common 
commercial satellite ground communications equipment pos-
                                                                                                                                     
current levels of modern electronics, the power levels needed to 
achieve these effects can be fairly moderate, and the matching of 
signal waveforms can be quite imprecise. 
Id. 
 118. Lincoln, supra note 114, at 50. 
 119. REPORT: DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DIRECTED ENERGY 
WEAPONS, supra note 114, at 41. 
 120. Wilson, supra note 110. 
 121. REPORT: DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DIRECTED ENERGY 
WEAPONS, supra note 114, at 38. 
 122. Wilson, supra note 110. 
 123. Gil Marshall, Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATS), 
http://www.space4peace.org/asat/asat.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Wilson, supra note 110. 
 126. Id. 
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sess electronic jamming capabilities that can—and have been 
used to—disrupt the functions of some satellites. 127  “The 
threshold for using these weapons has been lowered, with a 
number of nations employing them for political purposes in 
peacetime or during crises.” 128  While military satellites fre-
quently employ tactics such as encryption and “frequency hop-
ping” to prevent jamming, the militaries are increasingly rely-
ing on commercial satellites for communication.129 The United 
States Air Force currently has a satellite jamming system built 
by Northrop Grumman in 2004.130 
IV. CALL TO ACTION 
The time has come for the United States to take leadership in 
the creation of a kinetic ASAT test-ban-treaty in order to pro-
tect mankind’s use of outer space, which has become vital to 
our way of life. In the words of the U.S. Department of Defense 
and the U.S. Intelligence Community’s 2011 National Security 
Space Strategy, the “current and future strategic environment 
                                                                                                                                     
 127. Id. To use a famous example, on April 27, 1986, John MacDougall, 
a.k.a. “Captain Midnight,” a part-time engineer working at a satellite dish in 
Central Florida, spoofed transmissions from the Galaxy 1 communications 
satellite for over four and a half minutes in protest over the pricing increases 
by the HBO Corporation, who used that satellite. Paul McNamara, Captain 
Midnight: ‘No Regrets’ About Jamming HBO Back In ‘86, NETWORK WORLD 
(Apr. 26, 2011, 9:41 AM), 
http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/captain-midnight-has-no-
regrets-about-jamming. 
 128. Lynn, supra note 20, at 8. For instance, in late 2011, Iran engaged in 
the jamming of television coverage of political unrest in Egypt. Press Release, 
BBC, Iran Jamming BBC Persian Television (Nov. 2, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2011/02_february/11/pe
rsian.shtml. According to Jeffrey Kueter, satellite jamming happens “more 
regularly than we would like.” Patrick Temple-West, Spy Satellite Intercep-
tion Tests U.S. National Security Presence In Space, MEDILL REPORTS (Mar. 6, 
2008), available at 
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/washington/news.aspx?id=80751. 
 129. David Shiga, Mysterious Source Jams Satellite Communications, 
NEWSCIENTIST (Jan. 26, 2007, 11:45 AM), 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11033-mysterious-source-jams-
satellite-communications.html. 
 130. U.S. Satellite Jamming System, SPYFLIGHT.CO.UK, available at 
http://www.spyflight.co.uk/sat%20jam.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). 
2013] ANTI-SATELLITE MISSILE TEST-BAN TREATY 785 
is driven by three trends—space is becoming increasingly con-
gested, contested, and competitive.”131 
Space has become increasingly congested. There are current-
ly approximately 1106 operating satellites orbiting the 
Earth.132 Over the past decade, the number of satellite launch-
es has averaged seventy-six per year, with activity intended to 
increase by 50 percent in the coming decade.133 This congestion 
was highlighted in 2009 with the first accidental collision of 
satellites134 creating “a significant amount of debris in what 
was already the most crowded region of Earth orbit.”135 That 
collision, combined with the Chinese destruction of FY-1C, has 
contributed greatly to the nearly 22,000 man-made objects in 
orbit that are currently being tracked by the United States De-
partment of Defense.136 There are possibly hundreds of thou-
sands of additional pieces of debris that are too small to track, 
all of which carry the capability to damage operational satel-
lites in orbit.137 
At the same time, space has become increasingly contested 
and competitive. More than sixty nations and “government 
                                                                                                                                     
 131. UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY, 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE 1 (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/NationalSecurity
SpaceStrategyUnclassifiedSummary_Jan2011.pdf. 
 132. UCS Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (June 12, 
2012), 
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/
technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html. Approximately 443, or about 
43%, of the operating satellites are operated by the United States. This is 
about four times greater than the number of satellites operated by Russia, 
with 110, or China, with 120. Id. 
 133. Amos, supra note 15. 
 134. The collision occurred on February 10, 2009, when a Russian Commu-
nications satellite, Cosmos 2251, collided with a U.S. communications satel-
lite, Iridium 33. Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., Satellite Collision 
Leaves Significant Debris Cloud, 13 ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS 1 (Apr. 2009), 
available at 
http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv13i2.pdf. 
 135. Brian Weeden, Alternatives to a space weapons treaty, BULL. ATOMIC 
SCI. (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-
eds/alternatives-to-space-weapons-treaty 
 136. Unclassified Summary National Security Space Strategy, supra note 
131. 
 137. Id. 
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consortia” currently operate satellites.138 These space systems 
and their support infrastructures “face a range of man-made 
threats that may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy 
assets.” 139  Furthermore, although “the United States still 
maintains an overall edge in space capabilities, the U.S. com-
petitive advantage has decreased as market-entry barriers 
have lowered.”140 As more nations and non-state actors develop 
space—and counter-space (such as ASAT)—capabilities, 
threats to the stability and security of the space environment 
will continue to increase.141 
In this environment, it has become vital that the United 
States and other space powers secure the safety of their space 
assets with a ban on debris-producing intentional destruction 
or damage of space systems beyond a specified altitude in Low 
Earth Orbit.142 The United States is no longer assured of its 
long-term domination in space and cannot rely on the threat of 
retaliation to protect its satellites.143 It has become necessary to 
create diplomatic initiatives or join on to those already pro-
posed, such as the EU Code144 or the outline proposed by the 
Chinese and Russians,145 to “promote international norms of 
                                                                                                                                     
 138. Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, Statement Before the Senate Commit-
tee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces (May 11, 2011), 
http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/05%20May/Schulte%2005-11-
11.pdf. 
 139. UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY, supra 
note 131. Within months of the destruction of FY-1C, India announced that it 
was working on its own ASAT technology. Cynthia B. Zhang, Do As I Say, 
Not As I Do - Is Star Wars Inevitable? Exploring the Future of International 
Space Regime in the Context of the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy, 34 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 422, 431 (2008), quoting Vivek 
Raghuvanshi, China’s ASAT Galvanizes Indian Efforts, DEFENSE NEWS, Apr. 
9, 2007, at 20. 
 140. UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY, supra 
note 131. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Liemer & Chyba, supra note 75, at 154; see Wolter, supra note 33 at 
193. 
 143. Lynn, supra note 20, at 8. 
 144. Council Conclusions concerning the revised draft Code of Conduct for 
Outer Space Activities [hereinafter Council Conclusions] (EC) No. 14455/10 of 
27 Sept. 2010, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st14455.en10.pdf. 
 145. Carin Zissis, China’s Anti-Satellite Test, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 
(Feb. 22, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-anti-satellite-test/p12684; 
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responsible behavior.”146 Nations acting contrary to these es-
tablished norms would be singled out147 and could “expect to be 
isolated as rogue actors.”148 
Furthermore, any nation conducting a kinetic ASAT test will 
be liable under the OST and the Liability Convention of 1972, 
wherein “[n]o exoneration whatever shall be granted in cases 
where the damage has resulted from activities conducted by a 
launching State which are not in conformity with international 
law . . . .”149 A kinetic ASAT testing-ban gives that language 
teeth.150 Following the adoption of such a treaty, it will become 
possible to hold rule-breakers liable for damage resulting from 
a kinetic ASAT test under a negligence per se standard. 
Now is the time for the United States to take leadership in 
promoting a responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space, in part 
because of the ripeness of the U.S. political climate. The United 
States government has announced that it “will consider pro-
posals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equi-
table, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security 
of the United States.”151 
A treaty creating a testing-ban on the usage of kinetic ASAT 
technology would meet all the requirements set forth by the 
Obama Administration in that it would be “equitable, effective-
ly verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United 
                                                                                                                                     
Michael Krepon, supra note 19, at 167 (“China, Russia and many other coun-
tries support a treaty banning space weapons.”). 
 146. Lynn, supra note 20, at 8. 
 147. Schulte, supra note 138. 
 148. Lynn, supra note 20, at 8. 
 149. Liability Convention, supra note 58. 
  A successful ASAT test against an orbiting satellite with a kinetic 
kill vehicle will result in the destruction of the targeted satellite and 
the creation of dangerous fast-moving space debris. The resulting 
space debris is harmful interference that has the potential to dam-
age or destroy other objects in outer space, in particular objects op-
erating in similar orbits or intersecting orbits. . . . 
  To argue that one had no reason to believe that potentially harmful 
interference would occur is beyond the standards of good faith and 
due regard that are foundation of Article IX [of the OST]. 
Mineiro, supra note 44, at 342–43(2008) (emphasis in original). 
 150. See Krepon & Black, supra note 21, at 242 (“[W]ithout rules, there are 
no rule-breakers. A Code of Conduct would clarify rules and rule-breakers, 
making actions against the latter more likely to garner support.”). 
 151. Schulte, supra note 132. 
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States.”152 Any such treaty should require that member states 
refrain from the testing of any technology that intentionally 
brings about, directly or indirectly, physical damage, or de-
struction, of outer space objects below an altitude to be deter-
mined by the Secretary General of the United Nations, unless 
such action is conducted to reduce the creation of outer space 
debris and/or is justified by the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense in accordance with the United Nations 
Charter or imperative safety considerations.153 
A treaty creating a testing-ban on the usage of kinetic ASAT 
technology would be equitable; in other words, it would apply 
equally to all its member states. While it is possible to argue 
that some level of inequality exists because only the United 
States, Russia, and China currently possess kinetic-ASAT 
technology, disabling the usage of the technology does not 
weaken any country because of the availability of alternate 
technologies. 
Furthermore, a test-ban treaty would be verifiable, meaning 
that member states would be able to verify compliance by other 
member states. This would be especially true for the United 
States with its “unmatched ability to track launches, satellites, 
and debris.”154 A complete ban on the usage of ASAT technology 
has been called “effectively unverifiable and therefore not 
worth pursuing.”155 This criticism correctly identifies that na-
                                                                                                                                     
 152. Id. 
 153. This language is based on Art. II, Sec. 4.2 of the proposed European 
Code of Conduct, which states: 
The Subscribing States will, in conducting outer space activities: 
[R]efrain from any intentional action which will or might 
bring about, directly or indirectly, the damage or destruc-
tion of outer space objects unless such action is conducted to 
reduce the creation of outer space debris and/or justified by 
imperative safety considerations . . . . 
Council Conclusions, supra note 144. 
 154. Liemer & Chyba, supra note 75, at 155. 
 155. Frank M. Walsh, Forging A Diplomatic Shield for American Satellites: 
The Case for Reevaluating the 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chi-
nese Anti-Satellite System, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 759, 788 (2007) (internal cita-
tions omitted). “One reason cited by the Americans for not negotiating a[n 
ASAT] treaty is that it would give an edge to countries (for which, read Chi-
na) that are trying to hide their efforts to build weapons for use in space.” 
ECONOMIST, supra note 87. 
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tions and intra-national institutions cannot reasonably monitor 
the research and development happening within the laborato-
ries of space-capable actors.156 However, “it would be ‘relatively 
easy’ to detect the testing . . . or actual use of [kinetic] ASAT 
technologies.” 157  The United States’ immediate detection of 
China’s destruction of FY-1C “showcased how effectively Amer-
ican intelligence could detect ASAT tests; indeed, the United 
States also detected the two previous [Chinese ASAT] tests . . . 
.”158 
A kinetic ASAT test-ban treaty also enhances the security of 
the United States. While the administration of President 
George W. Bush claimed that such a treaty would interfere 
with the inherent right of self-defense—“including the right to 
defend space assets”159—such an assertion is incorrect.160 The 
United States is the nation with “the most to lose,” from an ac-
cumulation of space debris.161 The U.S. military relies heavily 
on satellite technology for “intelligence, communications, mete-
orology and precision targeting.”162 In the 2003 Iraq War, the 
United States “employed more than 50 military-specific satel-
lites plus numerous commercial satellites.”163 Without the as-
sistance of space-based capabilities, American military forces 
                                                                                                                                     
 156. See Walsh, supra note 155, at 789. 
 157. Id. at 791  (quoting ALLAN S. KRASS, VERIFICATION: HOW MUCH IS 
ENOUGH? 103 (1985)). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Krepon & Black, supra note 21, at 242. Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), 
of the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, has also ex-
pressed this concern. Turner Brinton, Sessions, Schulte Spar Over Proposed 
Space Accord, SPACENEWS.COM (May 13, 2011), 
http://www.spacenews.com/policy/110513-sessions-schulte-spar-accord.html. 
 160. See Krepon & Black, supra note 21, at 242 (“A Code of Conduct does 
not nullify the right of self-defense. . . . With such a Code, the USA would still 
possess more capabilities than ever before to deter and, if necessary, punish 
states that take actions against US satellites.”). 
 161. Steven Lee Myers, Look Out Below. The Arms Race in Space May Be 
On, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at WK3 (“[T]he United States depends more 
than any other country on space for its national security.”); Terrence Smith, 
Challenges to Future U.S. Space Control, 
http://www.armyspace.army.mil/spacejournal/Article.asp?AID=24 (last visit-
ed Dec. 22, 2011) (“The U.S. military is more dependent on Space-based as-
sets than any other military on earth.”). 
 162. Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Future in Space: Implications for U.S. 
Security, SPACE.COM (May 24, 2005, 8:52 AM), available at 
http://www.space.com/1116-chinas-future-space-implications-security.html. 
 163. Id. 
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would be severely hindered.164 The American military’s reliance 
on satellites is its “Achilles’ heel.”165 It is “only a slight exag-
geration” to say that an M1-A1 tank would be unable to ma-
neuver in a combat zone without the aid of satellites.166 
The United States also relies heavily on satellites for its eco-
nomic security.167 Without the ability to use satellites, “[t]he 
global economic system would probably collapse, along with air 
travel and communications.”168 Cell phones and A.T.M.s, for 
example, would cease to function properly.169 
Additionally, adoption of a kinetic ASAT testing-ban would 
strengthen the United States’ ability to address other im-
portant international concerns. For instance, the Obama Ad-
ministration has made repeated attempts to create a Fissile 
Material Cut-off Treaty (“FMCT”), which would prohibit the 
production of plutonium and uranium for use in nuclear 
bombs.170 In this matter, China has “consistently linked discus-
sions on the ‘prevention of an arms race in outerspace’ with ne-
gotiations on an FMCT, suggesting that a lack of serious U.S. 
engagement on limiting space weapons could impede FMCT 
progress.”171 Furthermore, entering into a kinetic ASAT test-
ban treaty would serve as a stepping stone towards the crea-
tion of a “combined space doctrine with principles, goals, and 
objectives that, in particular, endorse and enable the collabora-
                                                                                                                                     
 164. “The loss of Space-based RSTA capabilities would have significant im-
pact on U.S. operations and would be difficult to rapidly augment or substi-
tute using strictly terrestrial assets.” Smith, supra note 161. The United 
States “no longer maintains comprehensive backup land lines” for communi-
cation. Walsh, supra note 155, at 771. 
 165. Walsh, supra note 155, at 772. 
 166. Myers, supra note 161. 
 167. Temple-West, supra note 128. 
 168. Myers, supra note 161. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Pakistani Nuclear Arms 
Pose Challenge to U.S. Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2011, at A1; Viola Gienger 
& Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Secretary Clinton Urges Treaty to Halt Produc-
tion of Nuclear Bomb Material, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2011, 6:41 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-28/clinton-urges-treaty-to-halt-
production-of-nuclear-bomb-material.html. 
 171. Liemer & Chyba, supra note 75, at 155 (quoting Hu Xiaodi, Ambassa-
dor, China, Statement at the Nine Hundredth Plenary Meeting of the Confer-
ence on Disarmament, 20 (Mar. 28, 2002), 
http://disarmament.un.org/Library.nsf/a61ff5819c4381ee85256bc70068fa14/b
16f9f8c1cf762d285256bdd0053524d/$FILE/pv900.pdf). 
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tive sharing of space capabilities in crisis and conflict.”172 This 
cooperation will serve to “augment U.S. national security space 
capabilities.”173 
The focus on a kinetic ASAT test-ban treaty is intentionally 
limited in scope. It does not address the testing of ASAT tech-
nologies that do not create debris.174 By staying confined to the 
effects of kinetic ASAT testing, the testing-ban would be “far 
easier to negotiate than previous space arms control pro-
posals.”175 It also avoids the problem of having to define a space 
weapon,176 which has been the downfall of previous negotia-
tions. 177 The different methods of defining what constitutes a 
space weapon has been a leading cause of the international 
arms control debate over space weapons being “frozen” for dec-
ades. 178  Furthermore, a kinetic ASAT test-ban-treaty would 
function as both an arms control measure and an environmen-
tal protection measure, thereby ensuring the continued use of 
the satellites on which we have come to rely.179 
                                                                                                                                     
 172. Unclassified Summary National Security Space Strategy, supra note 
131, at 16. “The benefits of an ASAT treaty would extend beyond protecting 
American satellites . . . .” Walsh, supra note 155, at 778; see generally Press 
Release, Conference on Diasarmament Discusses Prevention of an Arms Race 
in Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/%28httpNewsByYear_en%29/23B0
ED99B9B9B43BC1257A4C003F86B9?OpenDocument. 
 173. Unclassified Summary National Security Space Strategy, supra note 
131, at 16. 
 174. Liemer & Chyba, supra note 75, at 155. 
 175. Id. at 154. 
 176. See Krepon & Black, supra note 21, at 242. 
 177. For instance, see supra note 80. See supra notes 78–79 and accompany-
ing text. 
 178. Weeden, supra note 135. 
 179. See Liemer & Chyba, supra note 75, at 154. 
Many of us have become somewhat dependent on cell phones. We 
have plenty of company. The doctor who needs to make an emergen-
cy call or to use their pager, as well as the patient in dire need of as-
sistance, rely on satellites. Ambulances that cannot afford to take a 
wrong turn when every second counts also rely on satellites, if they 
use Global Positioning System devices. Tens of thousands of police 
cars in the United States now use satellites to help them get to 
where they need to go. We need satellites to warn us of dangerous 
storms that are approaching landfall. We need satellites to help with 
disaster relief to know the best place to for helicopters to land amidst 
the chaos of a disaster scene. We need satellites to help those in 
harm’s way, whether they are wearing a military uniform or not. We 
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Any proposed treaty should differ from currently proposed 
treaties, such as the EU Code or the Code proposed by the 
Henry L. Stimson Center, in several ways. First, it should not 
create a total ban on the usage of kinetic ASAT technology, as 
the EU Code does.180 Any proposed language should allow the 
use, and even testing, of kinetic ASAT technology below a cer-
tain altitude. This would allow for nations that currently lack 
ASAT technology to develop it, which may facilitate its ac-
ceptance into the international community because countries 
that are developing their space capabilities might regard a uni-
versal ban as a means to “lock in an advantage” for China, 
Russia, and the United States.181 Such countries “might view a 
universal test ban as unacceptably discriminatory, and there-
fore choose not to join or to undermine such an agreement.”182 
The allowance for sub-altitudinal testing also allows for de-
fensive measures to be taken by capable nations. Possible req-
uisite scenarios vary from the fanciful183 to those that have al-
ready occurred, such as the shooting of US-193 or the falling 
satellite that captured attention in September 2011.184 A kinet-
ic ASAT ceiling would allow for the United States (and other 
nations) to remain free to intercept such de-orbiting satellites 
for the protection of people on the planet’s surface and of pro-
prietary technology. States must simply ensure that these 
measures are taken using reasonable efforts to minimize the 
creation of space debris. 185 
                                                                                                                                     
need these satellites more than we appreciate—every single day. 
Satellites are life savers. They are also essential for national and 
economic security. The United States is utterly dependant on satel-
lites, and other countries are becoming more dependent on them. 
Satellites serve global needs. 
Krepon, supra note 19, at 165. 
 180. This criticism comes from Paula DeSutter, former Assistant Secretary 
of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. Jeff Foust, Debat-
ing A Code Of Conduct For Space, SPACE REVIEW (Mar. 7, 2011), 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1794/1. 
 181. Liemer & Chyba, supra note 75, at 157. 
 182. Id. 
 183. For a list of such ideas in popular culture, see Asteroids in Fiction, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asteroids_in_fiction (last updated 
May. 11, 2012). 
 184. See Kenneth Chang, Satellite’s Fall Becomes Phenomenon, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 23, 2011, at A22. 
 185. This has been shown to be possible. Mineiro, supra note 44, at 353. 
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Having the Secretary General of the United Nations deter-
mine the altitudinal cap addresses another flaw in the EU 
Code. This flaw was identified by Scott Pace, Director of the 
Space Policy Institute at George Washington University, who 
expressed concerns about the vagueness of the EU Code’s ref-
erence to “‘international law and security, safety and integrity 
standards’ for respecting the safety of objects in space, without 
being more specific.”186 Allowing the Secretary General of the 
United Nations to determine the altitudinal cap solves the 
vagueness issue by having a single, identifiable, non-partisan 
entity decide what the appropriate altitude should be. It also 
incorporates lesser space powers because the cap would be de-
termined by discussions between the space powers or through 
negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament.187  Further-
more, having the altitude set by the United Nations circum-
vents another problem in space-relevant international rela-
tions: there is currently “no international consensus on where a 
nation’s airspace ends and space begins.”188 
Any proposed treaty language should also allow for physical 
damage to be caused to outer space objects for the purpose of 
eliminating space debris and for the protection of important 
space assets in low-earth orbit. Such “housekeeping” measures 
may become necessary to prevent the Kessler syndrome, which 
“will make vast swathes of low-Earth orbit completely unusa-
ble.”189 This allowance echoes the EU Code, but differs from the 
Code of Conduct being proposed by the Henry L. Stimson Cen-
                                                                                                                                     
[C]onducting a kinetic ASAT intercept on an orbiting satellite does 
not in and of itself constitute unavoidable harmful contamination of 
outer space. It is possible that the underlying target or technology of 
an ASAT test will generate unavoidable space debris. However, ki-
netic ASAT tests can be conducted against targets in orbits with alti-
tudes and inclinations that would minimize harmful contamination. 
Id. 
 186. “‘I always worry about whose standards, and what are those require-
ments, and what do they mean,’ he said.” Foust, supra note 180. 
 187. Liemer & Chyba, supra note 75, at 158. 
 188. Imburgia, supra note 16, at 611, citing U.N. Secretariat, Comm. on the 
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ered this issue since 1959, it remains unresolved.” Id. 
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ter, which focuses on “no harmful interference” with any space 
object.190 Permitting the possibility of debris mitigation allows 
for proactive solutions to the space debris problem, such as 
those proposed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (“DARPA”) or Dr. Marco Castronuovo of the Italian 
Space Agency.191 The international community should seek to 
facilitate the solution to the problem of space debris, not hope 
that inaction will lead to the problem resolving itself. 
Finally, as previously discussed, any treaty should focus sole-
ly on the physical effects caused by kinetic ASAT testing, which 
would facilitate its acceptance. By focusing on the physical ef-
fects, such language would also help to ensure a verifiable ban 
but would not ban non-kinetic ASAT research. It seems impos-
sible to determine if another nation is conducting non-physical 
ASAT technology testing on its own satellites; however, nations 
would be able to observe a kinetic ASAT test using already ex-
isting technology.192 
CONCLUSION 
The time has come for the United States to take leadership in 
the creating of a kinetic ASAT test-ban-treaty in order to pro-
tect mankind’s use of outer space, which has become vital to 
our way of life. Unless action is taken soon to address the crea-
tion of space debris, the danger will continue to grow and will 
curtail mankind’s freedom to act in space.193 As demonstrated 
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down . . . .” Palmer, supra note 107. DARPA’s proposed plan—Operation 
Phoenix—would involve a similar robotic-arm/satellite-catching concept, but 
instead would recycle parts from now defunct satellites to be used for the cre-
ation and maintenance of newer satellites. DARPA Wants to Recycle Space 
Junk Into New Satellites, SPACE.COM (Oct. 20, 2011), 
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satellites.html. It is likely that Operation Phoenix is similarly politically not 
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in Part III, there exists other, preferable technologies to replace 
kinetic ASATs as a means of national self-defense in a time of 
war. With America’s, and in fact the whole world’s, increasing 
reliance on space technologies194 and the burgeoning hopes of 
exploring beyond our planet,195 it is necessary to ensure contin-
ued access to orbit. An increase in the amount of debris in orbit 
would significantly impair such usage and exploration. Ban-
ning the testing of kinetic ASAT technology is an achievable 
goal that will do much to prevent this increase. By taking ac-
tion soon, the United States can prevent the type of failure 
prophesized by President Lyndon Johnson.196 
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